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I. INTRODUCTION
Dispatch notifies police that John Doe is walking erratically down the
middle of a busy street. At the scene, police quickly identify John, arrest
him, and transport him to the county jail. During this initial contact, the
arresting officers immediately notice John’s irregular breathing, dilated
pupils, pale and sweat covered face, and white saliva around his mouth.
The booking process reveals John’s history of substance abuse and preexisting
health complications. Despite indications John will experience a dangerous
and painful withdrawal process, jail staff place John in a padded cell and
do not order a medical exam. John then experiences twenty-four hours of
excruciating pain until the various bodily changes involved in drug withdrawals
exacerbate his preexisting health condition. John begs the staff for help,
but they do not call for medical assistance. When jail staff find him
unconscious the following day and transport him to the hospital, it is too
late. He dies a week later.1
Unfortunately, John’s story occurs frequently in the United States, and
recent trends predict future increases in contact between addicted detainees
and the prison system.2 In 2014, alcohol and drug abuse caused 8.5% of
the deaths in local jails, and 1.4% of the deaths in state prisons.3 About
25% of the country’s inmates depend on or abuse opioids.4 In California
prisons, drug and alcohol overdoses increased 113% between 2015 and 2018,

1. See Villarreal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D.
Cal. 2017). This hypothetical is based on the facts of Villarreal, where officers detained
Lara Gillis for over twenty-four hours and ignored her cries for help as she underwent
medically unsupervised drug withdrawals in a county jail cell. See id. The withdrawal
process aggravated her preexisting infection and caused lethal organ failure. Id.
2. See Michael Linden et al., Prisoners as Patients: The Opioid Epidemic,
Medication-Assisted Treatment, and the Eighth Amendment, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 252,
252 (2018). One study indicates state and federal reforms will reduce prescription opioid use;
however, increases in illicit opioid use may outweigh these gains. See Michael Devitt,
Research Shows the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic Is Far from Over, AM. ACAD. FAM.
PHYSICIANS (Feb. 20, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/
20190220opioidprojections.html [https://perma.cc/T93W-EWTE]. Restricting prescriptions
will likely cause addicts to turn to more dangerous, illicit opioids. See id. Without serious
policy changes, annual opioid-related deaths could rise to 82,000 by 2025. Id. The study
predicts more than 579,000 opioid-related deaths between 2016 and 2025, with 86% of these
deaths attributable to illicit opioids. Id.
3. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 257.
4. See Erick Trickey, How the Smallest State is Defeating America’s Biggest Addiction
Crisis, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/25/
rhode-island-opioids-inmates-219594 [https://perma.cc/FS3X-CFYT]. According to the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 65% of the American prison population has a substance
use disorder. See Criminal Justice DrugFacts, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (June 2019),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/
7RWD-TQVH].
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with much of the increase attributed to the opioid crisis.5 When police
detain an opioid addict without any treatment or monitoring, they risk
subjecting the person to suffering and death.6
John’s civil claim against the county jail would rely on a three-part legal
theory: (1) the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment;7
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides individuals with a civil remedy when state
and local governments violate a constitutional right;8 (3) the Supreme
Court in Estelle v. Gamble held that deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.9 John’s case would hinge on whether drug addiction and
withdrawals constituted a serious medical need, such that the jail’s deliberate
indifference to his condition violated the Eighth Amendment.10 This Comment
addresses the possible barrier to John’s claim—the uncertain status of
addiction as a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court employs a flawed framework for evaluating whether a
particular state practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.11 The
Court’s examination of a practice like forcing addicted detainees to withdraw
“cold turkey” hinges on an objective question: does the practice fall below
society’s evolving standards of decency?12 Some federal courts interpret

5. Megan Cassidy, Overdoses in California Prisons Up 113% in Three Years, S.F.
CHRON. (May 5, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Overdoses-in-Californiaprisons-up-113-in-three-13819811.php [https://perma.cc/XL5D-YNXF]. For more detail
on the opioid crisis’ increasing presence in prisons, see generally Emily Vaughn, Opioid
Addiction in Jails: An Anthropologist’s Perspective, NPR (Nov. 12, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/11/12/777586941/opioid-addiction-injails-an-anthropologists-perspective [https://perma.cc/4PTT-YVB5].
6. See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: THE UNTOLD STORIES
OF JAIL DEATHS IN WASHINGTON 2–3 (2019), https://columbialegal.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/Gone-But-Not-Forgotten-May2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9SX-X939].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Pretrial detainees like John must
sue under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; however, the court’s actual
legal analysis will revolve around Eighth Amendment interpretation. See Castro v. County
of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2016).
10. See Villarreal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1181 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
11. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339–45 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
evolving standards of decency would uphold practices like the execution of child rapists,
if a majority of states allowed the practice. See John F. Stinneford, Evolving Away from
Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 88 (2010).
12. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 101–02.
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society’s standards as having sufficiently advanced to classify addiction
as a serious medical need.13 Other federal courts interpret these standards
as not having sufficiently advanced.14
The problem with tethering Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to societal
standards is twofold: (1) courts exploit the ambiguous guidelines for
interpreting these standards to rule based on their own policy preferences;15
and (2) societal standards can evolve in a direction that tolerates cruel and
unusual punishments for certain detainees, or condemns practices well
outside the Eighth Amendment’s scope.16 The Seventh Circuit and lower
courts in the Ninth Circuit definitively placed drug addiction under Eighth
Amendment protection,17 while the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
repudiated this categorization.18 Remedying the circuit split on whether
addiction constitutes a serious medical condition requires more than a new
deliberate indifference test.19 The Supreme Court should place deliberate
indifference to detainee addiction under Eighth Amendment protection

13. See, e.g., Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (holding drug addiction constituted
a serious medical need); Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 948
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding drug addiction constituted a serious medical need); Foelker v.
Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding opioid addiction constituted a
serious medical need).
14. See Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need); see
also Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding decedent’s addiction to
PCP did not constitute a serious medical need, and to classify it as such “would be a
startling step to take”).
15. For example, compare the Foelker and Bruederle opinions, where an Obama
appointee and a Bush appointee came to opposite conclusions despite very similar facts,
with the Foelker judge sympathizing with the addict and the Bruederle judge sympathizing
with law enforcement. Compare Foelker, 394 F.3d at 513 (holding drug addiction constituted
a serious medical need), with Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777 (holding drug addiction did not
constitute a serious medical need).
16. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, State Legislatures and Solving the Eighth Amendment
Ratchet Puzzle, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 677, 697–98 (2018). Contemporary societal standards
can condone punishments that the Founders viewed as cruel and unusual when they drafted
the Eighth Amendment. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. See Foelker, 394 F.3d at 513; Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1174; Hernandez,
110 F. Supp. 3d at 948.
18. See Grayson, 195 F.3d at 696; Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777; Burnette v. Taylor,
533 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008).
19. See Haley Loutfy, Health Care Behind Bars: Constructing a Uniform Deliberate
Indifference Standard to Prevent the Use of Eighth Amendment as Broad Prison Reform,
45 LINCOLN L. REV. 77, 95 (2018) (suggesting a modified deliberate indifference test).
The Supreme Court could adopt the Ninth Circuit’s test for evaluating serious medical
needs. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992). However, these
tests would not solve the root problem in the Supreme Court’s reliance on evolving standards
of decency and could force courts to protect every medical condition under the Eighth
Amendment. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
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and simultaneously depart from its evolving standards of decency rule.20
The historical rationale behind the Eighth Amendment supports a return
to the objective question of whether wanton infliction of pain occurred,
without considering whether a sufficient majority of the body politic deems
a particular condition worthy of protection.21
This Comment will provide (1) the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning
with regard to passive deprivations; (2) the Supreme Court’s shift from wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain to evolving standards of decency; (3) a
critique of the evolving standards rule; and (4) a solution that eliminates
the evolving standards rule, returns to the question of wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain, and recommends legislative reforms states should make
in response.
II. A BROAD ORIGINAL MEANING
Several important historical events helped spur the Founders to create
the Eighth Amendment. These events demonstrate a wider scope of potential
cruel and unusual punishments than the Supreme Court initially identified
in the nineteenth century.22
The American Founders behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
had in mind historical cases encompassing a wide range of punishments,
including passive punishments that inflicted pain through deprivation.23
20. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 89–90 (discussing how a return to the
Eighth Amendment’s original meaning would insulate the amendment’s interpretation
from volatile public opinion while effectively protecting against severe abuses in the
criminal justice system). This return would also remedy the practical and constitutional issues
with the Supreme Court’s modern Eighth Amendment interpretation, although it would
come at the expense of some protections for prison conditions. See Jeffrey D. Bukowski,
Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases Is Not Beyond the Bounds
of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 437 (1995).
21. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
departure from the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning necessitated the problematic
evolving standards rule).
22. Courts in the nineteenth century narrowly construed the Eighth Amendment to
prohibit only the worst forms of punishment. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–
37 (1878) (finding the Eighth Amendment prohibited barbarous punishments resembling
torture). However, the Founders likely considered a wide range of punishments when they
penned the Eighth Amendment, including subjecting prisoners to harrowing prison conditions.
But see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 231–37 (1999).
23. See The HMS Jersey, HIST. (Mar. 19, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/
american-revolution/the-hms-jersey [https://perma.cc/55E8-U77E]; Abraham Holmes,
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The Founders and reformers before them identified instances of both
active torture and passive neglect as particularly cruel and unusual.24 The
rationale behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, as discussed
and interpreted in Wilkerson, indicates the Founders sought to proscribe
practices that subjected detainees to “terror, pain, or disgrace.”25
The Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles and Gregg v. Georgia adopted the
evolving standards rule because it found the historical Eighth Amendment
interpretation too rigid to sufficiently curtail government abuses.26 However,
from sixteenth century England to the time of the American founding,
reformers took a wide view of potentially cruel and unusual practices,
condemning and gradually eliminating those that inflicted disproportionate,
arbitrary, or unnecessary pain and suffering on detainees.27 For the purposes
of this Comment, active infliction of pain generally involves torture or
beatings, while passive infliction of pain generally involves deprivation
and neglect.28
The Founders behind the Eighth Amendment considered a wide variety
of practices when they proscribed cruel and unusual punishment.29 The
Tudor monarchy sanctioned numerous grotesque forms of torture and execution,
including the “rack” in the Tower of London.30 Robert Beale, an advisor
Judicial Power, Address Before the Massachusetts Convention on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 109, 111 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1901); LEVY, supra note 22, at 232–37.
24. See Timothy J. Compeau, Prisoners of War, WASHINGTON LIBR., https://www.
mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/prisoners-of-war/ [https://
perma.cc/2XKD-4DRG]; Abraham Holmes, supra note 23, at 11; LEVY, supra note 22, at
232–37.
25. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135 (discussing how English monarchs frequently
interceded to remove the “ignominious and more painful” aspects of a proscribed punishment,
and how this practice inspired the Eighth Amendment).
26. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (recognizing the Eighth Amendment’s
scope is “not static”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (finding the Eighth
Amendment prohibits more than “barbarous” punishments when interpreted in a “flexible
and dynamic manner”).
27. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37 (finding that at the time of the founding,
American courts upheld barbaric punishments like hanging, drawing, and quartering, but
increasingly declined to prescribe these sentences in a general spirit of leniency).
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (recognizing the distinction between “torture” and “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment”).
29. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36 (listing several “atrocities” the English
committed in punishing criminals, including dragging them to the place of execution, drawing
and quartering, public dissection, and burning alive; noting “it is safe to affirm” the Eighth
Amendment generally targeted torture and “unnecessary cruelty”).
30. Geoffrey Abbott, Rack, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 9, 2007), https://
www.britannica.com/technology/rack-torture-instrument [https://perma.cc/M8PG-9P6Y];
see LEVY, supra note 22, at 234.
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to King James I, condemned royal use of the rack, calling the practice
“cruel, barbarous, contrary to law, and unto the liberty of English subjects.”31
In 1615, the Court of King’s Bench declared that throwing a man into a
dungeon with no bed or food for criticizing an officer of the crown represented
an “unlawful or extreme” punishment.32 In its condemnation of depriving
the man of food and water, the Court of King’s Bench acknowledged that
passive cruelty inflicts just as much pain and suffering as active cruelty,
and should be similarly protected against.33
The cruel and unusual language in the English Bill of Rights may have
referenced the actions of Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys, who notoriously
sentenced 841 prisoners to slavery in the West Indies for no less than ten
years.34 The case of Titus Oates similarly influenced the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.35 As punishment for Oates’s act of perjury, the English
court stripped Oates of his religious title, fined him 2,000 marks, ordered
him to be whipped continuously as he walked three and a half miles, then
placed in the stocks four times every year, and imprisoned for life.36 When
Parliament subsequently debated and upheld his sentence in 1689, the
dissenting lords described the punishment as barbarous, inhuman, unchristian,
and unjust.37 Parliament then drafted the punishment provision in the
31. LEVY, supra note 22, at 232 (quoting 1 THE LIFE AND ACTS OF JOHN WHITGIFT,
D.D. 402 (John Strype ed., 1792)).
32. Id. In another contemporary case, English authorities arrested a man for murder
and held him in a dungeon without food or light and forced him to lie in a coffin. ARTHUR
GRIFFITHS, THE CHRONICLES OF NEWGATE 181 (1884).
33. See LEVY, supra note 22 at 232. In the 1615 case Hodges v. Humkin, the King’s
Bench applied the Magna Carta’s prohibition on the “malicious kind of imprisonment,”
reflecting a longstanding concern with prison deprivations dating back to the thirteenth
century. See Hodges v. Humkin (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016; 2 Bulstrode Rep. 139,
140. The King’s Bench took issue with Hodges’s being “thrown into a dungeon, and
so to be there kept, without any bed to lie on, or any bread or meat to eat.” Id.
34. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 234. Jeffreys handed down both the enslavement
and Oates judgments, and his draconian views on criminal punishment were widely publicized.
See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 854–57 (1969); see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 234.
35. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236. Titus Oates falsely accused several Catholic
clergymen of treason, resulting in their executions. Id. He subsequently stood trial for
perjury, where the court could not issue a death sentence because the perjury was not a
capital offense. Id. The dissenters in the House of Lords who sought to overturn the sentence
made the first recorded use of “cruel and unusual punishment” to describe Oates’s sentence.
See Granucci, supra note 34, at 859.
36. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236–37.
37. Id. at 237. Levy argues the Oates case most likely influenced the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause because Parliament debated the case the same year it passed
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English Bill of Rights that same year.38 This wide variety of punishments
informed Parliament’s drafting of the cruel and unusual clause, the direct
precursor to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the Eighth
Amendment.39
The proposed American Constitution endeavored to create a strong
central, federal government with limited powers.40 At the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention, Abraham Holmes criticized the new government’s
ability to create and punish federal crimes without restraints preventing it
from “inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments” that would
make “racks and gibbets” seem mild in comparison.41 Holmes referenced
Tudor England with “racks and gibbets,” and made another historical reference
to the “diabolical” Spanish Inquisition.42 The Spanish Inquisition began
in 1478 and endured through the time of the American founding.43 Spanish
law forbade drawing blood and mutilation, thus torturers alternatively
inflicted pain by pulling prisoners’ arms with ropes until they dislocated,
forcing prisoners to ingest water, and stretching them on the rack.44 The
inquisitors designed these techniques to inflict pain without permanently
damaging the victim’s body.45 Holmes’s invocation of the Spanish Inquisition’s

the English Bill of Rights. Id. In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized
the influence of the Oates case on the Eighth Amendment, arguing the amendment’s
original scope and power “will be found portrayed in the reasons assigned by the members
of the House of Lords who dissented against two judgments for perjury entered in the
King’s bench against Titus Oates.” 217 U.S. 349, 390 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (citing
12 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 447 (T.B. Howell ed., 1812)).
38. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 237.
39. See Cruel and Unusual Punishments, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusual-punishments [https://perma.cc/
J5HV-N64N] (“It is clear from some of the complaints about the absence of a bill of rights
including a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments in the ratifying conventions
that tortures and barbarous punishments were much on the minds of the complainants, but
the English history which led to the inclusion of a predecessor provision in the Bill of Rights of
1689 indicates additional concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments.”).
40. See Holmes, supra note 23, at 111.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Edward A. Ryan, Spanish Inquisition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 28,
2015), https://www.britannica.com/technology/rack-torture-instrument [https://perma.cc/
WDH2-A2RK].
44. See RAFAEL SABATINI, TORQUEMADA AND THE SPANISH INQUISITION: A HISTORY
106–07, 134–35, 190 (2003). The Inquisition followed a grotesque political theory that
pain begets loyal subjects: “The Inquisition and its procedures look, above all, like a
system of social control. Nothing seems more coercive than raw power, exerted by means
of pain. Pain influences people effectively; it rams the collective will down the throat of
its victims.” ARIEL GLUCKLICH, SACRED PAIN: HURTING THE BODY FOR THE SAKE OF THE
SOUL 172 (2001).
45. See SABATINI, supra note 44, at 190.
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torture practices indicates the Founders understood the Constitution should
protect detainees from all forms of torture.
British prison ships during the Revolutionary War represented the most
recent example of cruel and unusual punishment for the Founders. An
estimated 11,000 American prisoners died aboard decommissioned British
ships during the Revolutionary War, primarily from disease and malnutrition.46
Under these conditions, prisoners aboard the HMS Jersey died at a rate
of twelve per night.47 One prisoner who spent two years aboard a British
prison ship wrote to his family, “[c]ould I draw the curtain from before
you; there expose to your view a lean Jaw. [M]ortal hunger laid his skinny
hand and whet to keenest Edge his stomach cravings, surrounded with
tattered garments, Rotten Raggs close beset with unwelcomed vermin.”48
In denying these detainees food, sanitation, and medical care, the British
subjected them to daily agony through systematic deprivation.49
George Mathews served in the Continental Army until his capture and
imprisonment in the HMS Jersey.50 Mathews survived his imprisonment
and eventually attended Georgia’s convention to ratify the U.S. Constitution.51
The suffering and death from designed neglect on the prison ships made
a lasting impression in the minds of the Founders from Mathews to George
Washington.52 Washington led negotiations to free prisoners of war aboard
British prison ships and personally warned a British general about the
inhumane conditions.53 The massive loss of life and horrific experiences
in the bellies of British prison ships provided the Founders with ample

46. See The HMS Jersey, supra note 23 (describing British prison ships as “[o]ne of
the most gruesome chapters in the story of America’s struggle for independence from
Britain”).
47. See id.
48. HARRY R. S TILES , L ETTERS FROM THE P RISONS AND P RISON -S HIPS OF THE
REVOLUTION 11 (1865).
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See G. Melvin Herndon, George Mathews, Frontier Patriot, 77 VA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 307, 308 (1969).
51. See GEORGE R. LAMPLUGH, POLITICS ON THE PERIPHERY: FACTIONS AND PARTIES IN
GEORGIA, 1783–1806, at 64–65 (1986).
52. See Compeau, supra note 24.
53. Id. George Washington warned the British general that “[o]bligation arising
from the Rights of Humanity, and claims of Rank are universally binding, and extensive . . . .”
Id. (quoting Letter from George Washington to Thomas Gage, in 3 GEORGE WASHINGTON
PAPERS 4 (Richard Varick ed., Aug. 11, 1775), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw3e.001/
?sp=4 [https://perma.cc/55KD-8DDW].
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motivation to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, in its active and
passive forms.54
III. FROM WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN TO EVOLVING STANDARDS
Before the Supreme Court’s adoption of the evolving standards rule in
1958, the Court construed the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment to protect against the wanton infliction of pain and
suffering.55 These earlier cases relied on the Eighth Amendment’s history
as a prohibition on torture and practices that resemble torture.56 During
the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided the Eighth
Amendment should protect inmates from all possible abuses, as opposed
to only those involving severe pain or risk of death.57
An 1852 Utah statute provided that persons convicted of capital offenses
could be shot to death.58 In 1878, the Supreme Court evaluated whether
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment
rendered that statute unconstitutional.59 Ultimately, the Court upheld the
state’s use of a firing squad to execute capital offenders, but it took the
opportunity to opine on the original meaning and spirit behind the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.60 While common law provided for many
severe punishments at the time of the American founding, contemporary
courts often declined to carry them out.61 Therefore, the Cruel and Unusual
54. At Virginia’s ratifying convention, Patrick Henry warned that without a
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, Congress could “introduce the practice of
France, Spain, and Germany of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will
say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and
they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government that
they must have a criminal equity . . . .” See Patrick Henry, Speech Before Virginia Ratifying
Convention (June 5, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 299, 301 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), https://ollresources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/1907/Elliot_1314-03_EBk_v6.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DE4Y-3LRF].
55. See Bukowski, supra note 20, at 422–23.
56. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (finding punishments
violated the Eighth Amendment when they involved torture or a lingering death).
57. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976).
58. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 130 (1878).
59. Id. In Wilkerson, the Court confined its analysis to the constitutionality of the
manner of inflicting death, and not the death penalty itself. See Bukowski supra note 20,
at 423.
60. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37. After Wilkerson, Utah used the firing squad for
executions for 125 years, abandoning the practice in 2004. See Utah Brings Back Firing
Squad Executions, NPR (Apr. 5, 2015 7:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/05/39 7672199/
utah-brings-back-firing-squad-executions-witnesses-recall-the-last-one [https://perma.cc/
W4TK-U36A]. Utah reinstated the firing squad in 2015, becoming the only state in the
United States to employ the method of execution. Id.
61. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
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Punishment Clause generally proscribed any unnecessarily cruel practices
that inflict “terror, pain, or disgrace.”62 “[T]error, pain, or disgrace” encompass
the wide range of potential cruel and unusual punishments indicated in the
clause’s conception.63 The Court did not, however, tether its analysis to
any notions of evolving societal decency.64 Even when the Court expanded
Eighth Amendment protection in 1910 to include punishments disproportionate
to the underlying crime, it relied on the amendment’s historical meaning
and precedent caselaw.65
The evolving standards rule permits courts to interpret the Eighth
Amendment in a “flexible and dynamic manner” that conforms to progressing
societal attitudes toward a particular punishment.66 The Supreme Court
first invoked the evolving standards rule with regard to the Eighth
Amendment in Trop.67 Here, the Court considered whether denationalization
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.68 A military court convicted
the petitioner of desertion and removed his American citizenship, pursuant to
a federal statute.69 The Court found denationalization disproportionately

62. Id.
63. Id. at 135–36. While later courts could have broadly interpreted the “terror,
pain, or disgrace” from Wilkerson, they maintained a narrow interpretation focused on
particularly barbarous practices. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
64. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37.
65. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371–72, 375–76 (1910).
66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976). The evolving standards rule permitted
the Court to apply constitutional principles “to a much wider set of circumstances than
those which first gave rise to those principles.” Bukowski supra note 20, at 423.
67. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”). The Court determined the Eighth Amendment’s limited language
necessitated an adaptable meaning that could change over time and not remain static. Id.
at 101. One commentator later characterized this evolving, adaptable interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment as “an old, simple-minded Whig view that human history reflects
progressive moral development.” Eric Posner, The Eighth Amendment Ratchet Puzzle
in Kennedy v. Louisiana, SLATE (June 25, 2008, 11:06 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2008/06/the-eighth-amendment-ratchet-puzzle-in-kennedy-v-louisiana.html [https://
perma.cc/4MEX-BSCB].
68. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. Denationalization is the administrative or legal practice of
stripping an individual of his or her citizenship involuntarily. Denationalization, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
69. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87–88. The petitioner escaped from a military prison on
an American military base in Morocco during World War Two. Id. at 87. He attempted
to travel toward Casablanca, Morocco, and voluntarily surrendered himself to passing
American military personnel. Id.
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punished the crime of desertion.70 The Court did not mention the broad
historical condemnation of disproportionate punishments, which did in
fact inform the original rationale behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.71 According to the Trop opinion, the Eighth Amendment precludes
denationalization for desertion cases because the amendment’s interpretation
should conform to society’s evolving standards and not remain static.72
Eighteen years after Trop, the Supreme Court declared in Gregg that the
Eighth Amendment could eliminate any punishment that did not conform
to the evolving standards of decency.73 Here, the Court considered a defendant’s
appeal of his death penalty sentence for armed robbery.74 The evolving
standards rule required that any analysis of cruel and unusual punishment
should objectively incorporate the “public attitude toward a given sanction.”75
The standards of decency permitted the death penalty as a constitutional
punishment, given contemporary legislation authorizing the death penalty
in thirty-five states, referenda upholding the practice, the frequency of
jury death penalty verdicts, and public opinion polling.76
Expanding the evolving standards rule in Gregg, the Supreme Court
simultaneously recognized that many punishments unavoidably involve
pain, and these punishments are permissible under the Eighth Amendment
provided that their infliction of pain was not unnecessary and wanton.77
70. Id. at 101.
71. Id. at 99–100. The Court advocated an evolving standard because historical
precedent narrowly confined the Eighth Amendment protections to punishments resembling
torture. Id. However, the English Parliament condemned Titus Oates’s punishment
primarily because it disproportionately punished perjury, and this condemnation likely
inspired the Cruel and Unusual Clause. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236–37. Condemnation
of punishments for their asymmetry to the crime committed, as opposed to the pain they
entailed, hails back to the Magna Carta in medieval England. See Granucci, supra note
34, at 845–46.
72. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01.
73. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment
has not been regarded as a static concept. . . . [A]n assessment of contemporary values
concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the
Eighth Amendment.”).
74. See id. at 158.
75. Id. at 173. In Gregg, the court relied on state statutes, state referenda, jury
verdicts, and public opinion polls to discern the public attitude. Id. at 179–82. In Trop, this
analysis also incorporated international acceptance of a practice. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.
76. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–82. After the Supreme Court temporarily struck
down the death penalty schemes of every state in Furman, thirty-five states enacted statutes
formally authorizing the practice for various offenses to protect its use. Id. at 179–80. The
Court also cited Gallup polls indicating 59% of Americans supported the death penalty.
Id. at 181 n.25. According to Gallup, support for the death penalty hit an all-time low of
40% around 1967, but grew over 19% during the subsequent decade. See Death Penalty,
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/PSU9-A5BL].
Today, 56% of Americans favor the death penalty for convicted murderers. Id.
77. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
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In Gregg, the Court referenced Justice Burger’s dissent from Furman v.
Georgia in arguing cruel and unusual punishments “involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.”78 However, evolving standards of decency
should inform the necessity of the practice.79 The original dissenting opinion
from Justice Burger in Furman provided further that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits any punishment that resembles torture in its extreme cruelty.80
In Gamble, the Court considered whether a prison’s lack of medical
attention to a prisoner’s back injury constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.81 First, the Eighth Amendment could apply to deprivations
suffered during imprisonment apart from the specific sentence.82 Second,
the evolving standards of decency rule should determine whether the
prison violated the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right when it deliberately
ignored his medical complaints.83 Here, deliberate indifference to back pain
did violate the evolving standards of decency because twenty-two states
had statutes providing for a standard of medical care for inmates.84 Gamble
did not cite contemporary public opinion polls, jury verdicts, or state
referenda. 85
After Gamble, the Supreme Court held a wide variety of practices constituted
deliberate indifference and violated the Eighth Amendment.86 Wilson v.

78. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
79. Id.
80. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 392–93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). The plaintiff, an inmate of the
Texas Department of Corrections, sustained an injury during a “prison work assignment.”
Id. at 98.
82. See id. at 103–04.
83. Id. at 106 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs represented
cruel and unusual punishment). The Court also noted medical malpractice did not amount
to an Eighth Amendment violation unless the actor was deliberately indifferent and the
medical need was serious. Id. Deliberate indifference is synonymous with recklessness
or wantonness, requiring a conscious disregard of a known risk. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994).
84. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103 n.8. The regulations in a minority of states sufficed to
establish a new standard of decency with regard to prison conditions. See id.
85. See id. at 103–04.
86. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (finding that exposure to
tobacco smoke constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
296 (1991) (holding overcrowding, excessive noise, and unsanitary conditions constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, which did not require any personal, physical injury); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1978) (holding that overcrowding, lowered food rations,
the mixing of sick and healthy inmates, and general maltreatment, constituted cruel and
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Seiter rejected the idea that the Eighth Amendment only applied to the
wanton infliction of pain.87 Now, painless conditions like unsanitary and
overcrowded prison cells or exposure to tobacco smoke could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.88 These cases rested on the assertion in
Gamble that societal standards could mature and place various medical
conditions under the Eighth Amendment umbrella.89
Beginning in the 1970s, American society soured on the idea of lenience
toward drug addiction, as manifested in public opinion and legislation.90
Few states elected to provide formal detoxification facilities, procedures,
and dedicated staff for addicted detainees.91 Given this sustained trend away
from lenience, and the lack of legislation providing for accommodation of
addicted detainees, several circuit courts remain reluctant to categorize
addiction as a serious medical need, while the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the topic.92
In the 1990s, pharmaceutical companies and the medical community began
to aggressively prescribe pain medication.93 Patients developed intense
addictions to these medications, and the medical community failed to address

unusual punishment); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 89–90 (2007) (finding a prison violated
the Eighth Amendment when it stopped an inmate’s hepatitis C treatment).
87. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305–06 (holding that deliberate indifference to overcrowding,
excessive noise, insufficient locker space, inadequate heating and cooling, inadequate ventilation,
unclean and inadequate restrooms, and unsanitary food preparation, could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment).
88. See id.; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
89. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103–04.
90. See War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/
crime/the-war-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/2TH4-PPQR]. In 1971, President Richard Nixon
called drug abuse “public enemy number one.” Id. Contemporary Gallup polling found
48% of Americans identified drugs as a serious problem. Jennifer Robison, Decades of
Drug Use: Data From the ‘60s and ‘70s, GALLUP (July 2, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/
6331/decades-drug-use-data-from-60s-70s.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/UXZ5K4NE]. Subsequent measures involved increased funding for drug enforcement during
the Nixon Administration, and mandatory sentencing guidelines during the Reagan
Administration. See War on Drugs, supra. The United States still actively combats drugs,
particularly opioid addiction. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.
91. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. In 2016, Rhode Island became the first
state to enact a medication-assisted treatment program for opioid-addicted detainees. Id.
at 253. Connecticut and Vermont subsequently enacted similar programs. Id.
92. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding heroin addiction and withdrawal constituted a serious medical need such that
deliberate indifference toward them was a form of cruel and unusual punishment), with
Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding addiction
to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need).
93. See What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/9ZNZ-J722]
(last updated Sept. 4, 2019).
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over-prescription and fraud.94 This phenomenon combined with other factors,
such as economic depression in certain communities and the availability
of illicit opioids like heroin, to kill over 42,000 Americans in 2016 alone.95
The opioid crisis will likely increase in severity, despite the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) classifying the crisis as a public
health emergency in 2017.96 DHHS estimated 10.3 million Americans
abused opioids in 2018, while 130 Americans die from an opioid overdose
every day.97 Withdrawal symptoms often begin within twenty-four hours
after the last dose, and range from discomfort and vomiting, to high blood
pressure,98 to death when they exacerbate a preexisting condition or cause
the addict to commit suicide.99 As prisons and jails struggle to accommodate
increasing numbers of addicted detainees, more cases like John’s will arise,
necessitating a constitutionally sound and practical Eighth Amendment analysis
to adjudicate them.
IV. AN UNWORKABLE EVOLVING STANDARD
The evolving standards rule presents two problems: (1) courts use the
rule to disguise their own policy preferences as constitutional interpretation,
coming to different conclusions when analyzing the same practice under
the Eighth Amendment;100 and (2) societal standards can evolve in a direction
that tolerates cruel and unusual punishments for certain detainees, or condemns
practices well outside the Eighth Amendment’s scope.101

94. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC
137–38 (2015).
95. See What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 93.
96. See Devitt, supra note 2 (finding increasing illicit opioid use may outweigh gains
made from policies restricting prescription opioids); What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?,
supra note 93 (declaring a public health emergency in 2017).
97. What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 93.
98. See Withdrawing from Opiates and Opioids, HEALTHLINE, https://www.healthline.
com/health/opiate-withdrawal [https://perma.cc/95DN-PRJ6] (last updated July 12, 2019).
99. See Estate of Abdollahi v. County of Sacramento, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200
(E.D. Cal. 2005). The decedent in Abdollahi suffered from opioid withdrawals and committed
suicide in his cell after a lapse in observation. Id.
100. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding addiction constituted a serious medical need), with Bruederle v. Louisville Metro
Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding addiction did not constitute a serious
medical need).
101. See Usman, supra note 16, at 697–711. Additionally, contemporary societal
standards can condone punishments that the Founders viewed as cruel and unusual when
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A. Evolving Standards as an Unconstitutional Trojan Horse
The Court provides inconsistent methods for ascertaining and applying
society’s standards in Eighth Amendment cases.102 The seventy years of
evolving standards cases since Trop reveal a pattern. Throughout these
cases, the Court chooses varying indicators of societal standards to arrive
at its desired conclusion, or ignores the indicators altogether and relies on
its own independent judgment.103 In this way, the evolving standards rule
allows the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, to substitute their own
policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation. Therefore,
the evolving standards rule resembles a Trojan horse, disguising policy
decisions as actual constitutional interpretation.104 The Supreme Court
supplants Congress’s role as a policymaking body when it makes policy
decisions without a precedential, statutory, or constitutional basis.105
Before Trop, Eighth Amendment interpretation did not invoke contemporary
societal standards of decency.106 When the Court handed down the Trop
they drafted the Eighth Amendment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340–45 (2002)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See discussion infra Section IV.A. Supreme Court rulings indicate a practice
can fall below society’s standards where a majority of states prohibit the practice, but also
when a small minority of states prohibit the practice, indicating “how far beyond any
cognizable constitutional principle the Court has reached to ensure that its own sense of
morality and retributive justice pre-empts that of the people and their representatives.”
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87 (“The evolving standards of decency test is
inherently majoritarian, and is thus a poor protection for criminal offenders when public
opinion turns against them. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has effectively replaced
this test with an unfettered reliance on its own ‘independent judgment,’ with no external
constitutional standard to guide its decisions.”). In Graham v. Florida, the Court declined
to use the evolving standards rule and based its authority on its own independent
judgement. 560 U.S. at 61–62.
104. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. Supreme Court cases like Graham and
Atkins highlight the shift toward full reliance on independent judgment, without any guiding
principles or doctrines. See id. Colwell provides an example of how the Trojan horse method
has seeped into the lower courts. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir.
2014). Here, the Ninth Circuit invoked the evolving standards rule without actually
analyzing society’s standards, then concluded the Eighth Amendment required medical
intervention for an inmate’s painless, benign cataract. See id. at 1063,1066–68.
105. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 78. The Constitution does not exist to “address
all ills in our society.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation.”
Id.
106. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (asserting for the first time in Supreme
Court jurisprudence that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). Before Trop, cruel
and unusual punishments were those that disproportionately punished an offense, inflicted
pain in a manner resembling torture, or caused death in a barbaric way. See Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
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decision in 1958, it contained no references to domestic opinion polls, jury
verdicts, or recent legislation.107 Instead, the Court focused on international
standards, where only two out of eighty-four countries imposed denationalization
as a penalty for desertion.108 The Court claimed the international community
almost unanimously rejected denationalization for any crime, but only
cited countries that used the penalty for desertion.109 This formula looks
internationally to establish contemporary standards of decency, examining
how other countries almost unanimously treat the specific crime.110
After Trop, the Supreme Court declined to wield the evolving standards
of decency as an effective rule, and narrowly applied the Trop holding in
other denationalization cases.111 Between Trop (1958) and Gregg (1976),
the Court only wielded the evolving standards rule once, holding in
Witherspoon v. Illinois that the practice of selecting jurors based on their
approval of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment.112 Here,
one domestic public opinion poll indicated 47% of Americans opposed
the death penalty for convicted murderers, while 43% favored the practice.113
The Eighth Amendment’s modern interpretation depended on the evolving
standards of decency, and public opinion polls demonstrated society’s

107. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101–04 (finding denationalization constituted “the total
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society”).
108. Id. at 103. Out of eighty-four countries, only the Philippines and Turkey punished
desertion with denationalization. Id.
109. Id. at 102 (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”).
110. See id. at 102–03.
111. See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 136–37 (1958) (holding the United
States could not withhold citizenship from a former member of the Japanese army without
proving voluntary service); Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 386–87 (1960)
(holding collateral estoppel applied in a case involving an individual losing his citizenship
after going to Mexico to flee the draft); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379 (1962) (holding
a person denied citizenship for draft evasion need not sue the government through the
procedures outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (holding any statute divesting a citizen of his citizenship for
leaving the country to avoid military service violated the procedural guarantees in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments).
112. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1968). The Court cited data
indicating less than half of Americans approved of the death penalty, and held juries
crucially imported these “community” values into the penal system, and the evolving
standards of decency require this link. Id. at 519–20.
113. Id. at 520 n.16. The International Review on Public Opinion poll found 47%
opposed the death penalty, 42% favored it, and 11% were undecided. Id.
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rejection of the death penalty.114 Witherspoon ignored other reputable polls
indicating significantly higher public support for the death penalty.115
According to Justice White, the majority’s disdain for the death penalty
compelled it to engage in policymaking under the guise of dubious constitutional
interpretation, instead of deferring to democratically elected legislators.116
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Gregg, ironically described
“evolving standards of decency” as an “oft-quoted phrase,”117 when the
Supreme Court only mentioned it once for substantive analysis during the
eighteen years between Trop and Gregg.118 In 1976, Gregg discussed a
challenge to Georgia’s death penalty scheme, relying on a new methodology
for determining the evolving standards of decency.119 Now Eighth
Amendment meaning hinged on domestic public opinion polling, legislative
enactments, and jury verdicts, as opposed to international norms.120 First,
two domestic public opinion polls showed between 57% and 59% support
for the death penalty.121 Second, state referendums in Massachusetts and
Illinois upheld the death penalty, thirty-five states enacted statutes providing
for the death penalty, and Congress penalized airplane piracy with death
in 1974.122 Third, juries infrequently imposed the death penalty when
114. See id. at 519–20. The Court found that public opinion rejected the death penalty,
and eliminating potential jurors based on their disapproval of the practice would create
unrepresentative juries. Id.
115. Compare Death Penalty, supra note 76 (indicating the death penalty enjoyed
54% support in 1967, a year before the Court decided Witherspoon), with Witherspoon,
391 U.S. at 520 (describing death penalty supporters as a “distinct and dwindling
minority”).
116. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (“If the Court can offer no
better constitutional grounds for today’s decision than those provided in the opinion, it
should restrain its dislike for the death penalty and leave the decision about appropriate
penalties to branches of government whose members, selected by popular vote, have an
authority not extended to this Court.”).
117. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (describing “evolving standards of
decency” as an “oft-quoted phrase” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.86, 101 (1958)).
118. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (finding the evolving standards of
decency indicated society disapproved of jury selection based on death penalty opinion
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)).
119. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 n.25.
120. See id.
121. Id. (citing Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death
Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1249 n.22 (1974)). One Gallup poll from 1972 found 57% of
Americans favored the death penalty, a stark increase from 42% cited in Witherspoon. Id.
(citing Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra, at 1249 n.22). A Harris survey from 1973 found 59%
of Americans favored the death penalty. Id. (citing Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra, at 1249
n.22).
122. Id. at 179–80 (first citing H.B. 212, §§ 2-4, 6-7 (Ala. 1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-452 to 13-454 (1973); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-4706 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.1, 209, 219 (West 1976); 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 52, § 4; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a25, 53a-35(b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1975); FLA.
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given the opportunity.123 While this statistic could indicate public disapproval
of the death penalty, the Court found infrequency only meant juries reserved
capital punishment for the most severe crimes.124 Gregg discerned the
evolving standards of decency with several domestic indicators of majority
public support for a particular practice, deriving Eighth Amendment meaning
from this support.125
In Gamble, the Court narrowly confined its analysis to legislative
enactments in a minority of states to discern the evolving standards of
decency.126 Twenty-two states provided for a standard of medical care in
prisons, indicating the evolving standards of decency now required Eighth
Amendment protection in cases of deliberate indifference to serious medical
STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (West 1975–1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528,
27-2534.1, 27-2537 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1975); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 9-1,
1005-5-3, 1005-8-1A (1976–1977); IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.020 (1975); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1976); MD. CODE ANN. § 27-413 (LexisNexis
1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (1975); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 559.009, 559.005 (West 1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-5-105 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.06 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.02-2929.04 (LexisNexis 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.1-701.3 (1975–
1976); 1974 Pa. Laws Act No. 46; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (West 1975); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-52 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.03(a) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (LexisNexis
1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.045,
9A.32.046 (1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1975); and then citing Antihijacking Act of
1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i), (n)). A 1968 Massachusetts initiative upheld the death penalty,
with 49% approving and 31% disapproving. See id. at 181 n.25. A 1970 Illinois referendum
upheld the death penalty, with 64% approving and 36% disapproving. See id. After Furman
struck down all death penalty schemes in the United States for their arbitrary nature, thirtyfive states enacted statutes reinstating the practice. See id. at 179–80. In 1974, Congress
passed the Antihijacking Act, making airplane piracy a capital offense. See Antihijacking
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 104, 88 Stat. 409, 411 (codified as amended 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(i)).
123. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. Death sentence jury verdicts varied widely between
1961 and 1972, and only 20% of murder convictions resulted in the death penalty in states
authorizing the practice. Id. at 182 n.26.
124. Id. at 182 (“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts does not indicate rejection of
capital punishment per se.”).
125. See id. at 187 (holding that the country’s “moral consensus” supporting the
death penalty helped indicate the practice was “not without justification and thus is not
unconstitutionally severe”). In Gregg, the Court’s chosen factors indicated a societal consensus
supporting the death penalty, but in subsequent cases it struck down laws despite similar
indicators of support. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.
126. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
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needs.127 This method rested on legislative enactments in a minority of
states, and not international norms, domestic public opinion, or jury verdicts.128
Sometimes, the Supreme Court ignores broad acceptance of a particular
condition or punishment, and declares evolving standards of decency
necessitate its prohibition.129 In Graham v. Florida, the Court held life
sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment
despite broad authorization of the practice in the federal system, thirtyseven states, and the District of Columbia.130 The 109 non-homicide
juvenile offenders serving life sentences at the time outweighed the broad
legislative approval of the practice, even though the Court made the
complete opposite finding in Gregg.131 In Atkins v. Virginia, the evolving
standards rule prohibited the execution of any mentally challenged person,
when only seven of the thirty-eight states permitting capital punishment
prohibited the entire practice.132 Therefore, when a practice complies with
the wanton and unnecessary rule, and enjoys majority support under the
metrics from Gregg, the Court may still invoke the evolving standards rule to
prohibit it.133
This approach acknowledges both the traditional wanton and unnecessary
rule and the newer evolving standards rule, but applies neither.134 In these
cases, the evolving standards rule resembles a Trojan horse, disguising

127. Id. at 103–05 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs represented
cruel and unusual punishment).
128. See id. at 103 n.8.
129. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding the Eighth Amendment
does not permit sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison for a non-homicide crime,
despite broad acceptance of the practice). Justice Thomas assailed this approach in his dissent
in Graham. See supra note 102.
130. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; see also id. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. Additionally, state legislation failed to indicate any trend
toward prohibition. Stinneford, supra note 11, at 88. Between 2002 and 2010, the
Court made four similar counter-majoritarian declarations despite invoking the majoritarian
evolving standards rule. Id. at 87.
131. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67 (finding that the infrequency of life sentences
for juvenile defenders indicated society rejected the practice). But see Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts does not indicate
rejection of capital punishment per se.”).
132. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
According to the Court, eighteen states prohibiting some executions of mentally challenged
persons, with only seven states prohibiting the practice outright, constituted enough of a
“national consensus” to compel its prohibition nationally. See id. at 313–16, 342.
133. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67 (finding that because only 109 non-homicide
juvenile offenders were serving life sentences, the practice’s infrequence indicated a
national consensus against it). While the Court still invokes the authority from Trop and
the evolving standards rule, “it no longer uses the test as a true ground for its decisions.”
Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.
134. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.
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policy decisions as actual constitutional interpretation.135 The Supreme
Court oversteps its mandate and undermines state and federal legislatures
when it makes policy decisions without a legal or constitutional basis.136
B. The Danger of Adherence to the Majority
Strict adherence to a majoritarian evolving standards rule, as demonstrated
in Gregg, tethers Eighth Amendment understanding to society’s opinion
about a practice at that moment in time.137 Deferring to society’s opinion
cuts against the Supreme Court’s mandate as an anti-majoritarian institution
that can protect unpopular positions and minorities.138 Society can become
(1) intolerant toward certain groups and condone their mistreatment;139 or
(2) overly lenient toward certain groups and require their accommodation

135. Id. When the Supreme Court ignores both the Eighth Amendment’s original
meaning and the evolving standards rule, and relies solely on its own independent
judgement, it operates without any “external constitutional standard to guide its decisions.”
Id. The American scheme of ordered liberty relies on “uniformly applied legal principle”
and not “ad hoc notions of what is right and what is wrong in a particular case.” John M.
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, in THE
EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN
M. HARLAN 289, 291–92 (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969). According to Justice Brennan,
“[t]he principle that our Government shall be of laws and not of men is so strongly woven
into our constitutional fabric that it has found recognition in not just one but several
provisions of the Constitution.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 252–53 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 95. The Constitution does not exist to “address
all ills in our society.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation.”
Id. When the judiciary makes decisions without a connection to any constitutional or legal
principle, it simply substitutes its own policymaking agenda for that of democratically
elected legislatures. See supra note 102. Justice Frankfurter argued the judiciary should
refrain from policymaking because “[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not
designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976) (holding that society’s
opinion, as manifested in legislation, jury verdicts, and polling data, indicated a standard
of decency that condoned the death penalty).
138. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. Determining constitutional law based purely
on policy preferences “runs contrary to basic principles of separation of powers.” Id.
139. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–904). Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986,
reflecting societal attitudes opposed to lenience for drug offenders. See War on Drugs,
supra note 90.
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well above constitutional standards.140 The late Justice Scalia summarized
these concerns when he said, “A Bill of Rights that means what the majority
wants it to mean is worthless.”141 Drug addicts and inmates often find
themselves on the list of unpopular minorities, and depend on anti-majoritarian
institutions like the Constitution and the Supreme Court to vindicate their
rights, regardless of society’s lenient or punitive stance toward them.142
The evolving standards rule, as it functioned after Trop, permits federal
courts to exclude addicted detainees from Eighth Amendment protection,
even when their cases exhibit signs of cruel and unusual punishment.
1. The Fallacy of Progressive Societal Standards
Society’s standards can evolve away from leniency.143 The evolving
standards rule emerged due to “overconfidence in the moral superiority of
the present.”144 In reality, societal tastes rarely progress in a single direction
and change quickly in response to events or new information about a
topic.145 For example, movement toward leniency for prison conditions
during the late twentieth century mirrored a simultaneous movement in
the opposite direction with regard to domestic and sexual violence.146 In
Kennedy v. Louisiana, the evolving standards rule required the elimination of
capital punishment for child rapists.147 This decision focused on legislative
approval for the penalty as outlined in Gregg.148 Originally, eighteen states
140. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (“[T]he Constitution does
not mandate comfortable prisons.”).
141. Steven F. Hayward, Two Kinds of Originalism, 45 NAT’L AFFS. 146, 155 (2017).
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence demonstrates his fear of “unqualified majoritarianism”
influencing constitutional interpretation. Id. Justice Scalia’s warning echoed Justice
Frankfurter’s Dennis concurrence: “History teaches that the independence of the judiciary
is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic, and social
pressures.” Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
142. The Kansas-Nebraska Act is another example of the problems with unfiltered
majoritarianism. See George F. Will, The Limits of Majority Rule, 28 NAT’L AFFS. 160,
161 (2016). Under the Act, Kansas and Nebraska could permit slavery with a majority
popular vote. Id. Abraham Lincoln opposed the Act because “there is more to America’s
purpose, more to justice, than majorities having their way.” Id. at 161–62.
143. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90.
144. See Usman, supra note 16, at 699.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 701.
147. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419–21 (2008).
148. Id. at 422. While the contemporary standards of decency would have permitted
the death penalty for child rapists, the Court followed the principle that “their own
judgment will be brought to bear on issues when a national consensus is not clear” to reach
the desired outcome of prohibiting the practice. Matthew C. Matusiak, Michael S. Vaughn
& Rolando V. del Carmen, The Progression of “Evolving Standards of Decency” in U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions, 39 CRIM. JUST. REV. 253, 264–65 (2014).
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and the federal government authorized execution of child rapists, and that
number dropped to three states after Furman forced all states to reenact
their death penalty statutes.149 While the decision left out public opinion
polling, the other metrics indicated the political and judicial systems
disfavored the practice.150 Given the strong public support for executing
child rapists, and the frequency with which societal values change, the
evolving standards could easily permit the practice in the future.151 Basing
interpretation on the spirit of the moment runs afoul of the Constitution’s
role as an enduring, principled document.152
Public attitudes toward juvenile offenders soured during the 1990s, due
to a moral panic around young “superpredators.”153 Highly publicized
acts of juvenile violence combined with statistics predicting a 23% increase
in the juvenile male population to generate public fears of a coming crime
wave.154 American politicians and public figures invoked the “superpredator”
concerns, and forty-five state legislatures moved to facilitate trying juvenile
offenders as adults.155 Because societal attitudes toward this demographic

149. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422 (finding the last execution for child rape occurred
in 1964).
150. See Usman, supra note 16, at 702 (finding that contemporary public polling
strongly suggested broad public support for executing child rapists). History follows
a less “sequential and progressive path” toward leniency, and instead, “[c]yclic processes
are far closer to the truth.” STEPHEN P. HINSHAW, THE MARK OF SHAME: STIGMA OF MENTAL
ILLNESS AND AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE 54 (2007).
151. See Usman, supra note 16, at 702.
152. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87–88. Writing for the majority in West Virginia
v. Barnette, Justice Jackson argued,
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts . . . . [F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
153. See PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN
BY THE LAW, at xi (1999).
154. Id. at 24. The series of schoolyard murders in the late 1990s stoked public fears
about a coming crime wave. See id. at 26, 29. In reality, overall and juvenile crime decreased
during this period, contrary to public fears around the topic. Id. at 26.
155. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90. During a televised discussion on the 1994
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, First Lady Hillary Clinton invoked the
“superpredator” label for juvenile offenders. See Allison Graves, Did Hillary Clinton Call
African-American Youth ‘Superpredators?’, POLITIFACT (Aug. 28, 2016, 4:46 PM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/28/reince-priebus/didhillary-clinton-call-african-american-youth-su/ [https://perma.cc/2948-MYT4].
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evolved away from leniency during this period, as expressed in legislative
enactments, strict adherence to the evolving standards rule would have
compelled the Court in Graham to uphold life sentences toward juvenile
offenders.156
American public opinion followed a similar pattern with regard to
drugs. Beginning in the 1970s, American society assumed a punitive stance
against drug use.157 This stance manifested in consistent public opinion
and legislation severely punishing drug related crimes.158 In 1969, 48%
of Americans identified drug use as a “serious problem in their community.”159
In 1986, 56% thought the United States did not spend enough on the war on
drugs.160 In 1995, 63% still identified drug use as a serious problem, while
31% called it a “crisis.”161 In 2018, drug convictions constituted 27% of the
overall criminal convictions in federal court, second only to immigrationrelated convictions.162 Much of the anti-drug legislation from this period
remains effective, although Congress recently reduced some punitive
measures in 2010 and 2019.163 Few states enacted legislation providing formal
detoxification facilities, procedures, and dedicated staff for detainees.164
Accordingly, Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting various amendments
followed society’s intolerance toward drug use.165

156. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90.
157. See Robison, supra note 90.
158. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the American public’s
hostility toward drugs beginning in the 1970s).
159. See Robison, supra note 90.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Table D-4, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/
d-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/12/31 [https://perma.cc/MHT7-XULV].
163. See War on Drugs, supra note 90. Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018,
in part helping federal prisoners reduce their sentences with good behavior. See Tim Lau,
Historical Criminal Justice Reforms Begin to Take Effect, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July
25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/historic-criminaljustice-reforms-begin-take-effect [https://perma.cc/S3F9-STR7].
164. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.
165. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding the Controlled Substances
Act, as applied to growers of marijuana for personal use, did not violate the Commerce
Clause); Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding Oregon’s regulation of
ceremonial ingestion of peyote did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (holding random drug tests of
students participating in sports did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (holding a police officer’s observation from a helicopter of a
partially covered marijuana greenhouse did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
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Today, these attitudes persist around addiction,166 and the evolving standards
rule allows judges to inject into deliberate indifference cases their reservations
about accommodating addicts. Consequently, circuit court rulings diverged
on whether addiction constituted a serious medical need, while the Supreme
Court has not ruled on the topic.167 In Shaver v. Brimfield Township,
an unpublished opinion, a U.S. district court in Ohio disregarded the high
risk of pain and death for withdrawing detainees, finding addiction did not
constitute a serious medical need.168 In Bruederle v. Louisville Metro
Government, the Sixth Circuit found that despite the risks involved in cold
turkey withdrawal, the intensity varied too often to designate withdrawal
as a serious medical need.169 In Grayson v. Peed, the Fourth Circuit likewise
declined, arguing such a ruling would force officers to bring all suspects
to the hospital instead of detention centers when they exhibited any signs
of drug addiction.170 Providing Eighth Amendment protection for addicted
detainees, the court added, “would be a startling step to take.”171 In Burnette
v. Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit displayed identical reservations about medically
evaluating addicted arrestees to determine the risk level.172
Finally, the ruling in the unpublished case Estate of Hellman v. Kenton
County Jailer tellingly remarked, “[t]he day may yet come where a failure
to have medical personnel evaluate a severely intoxicated detainee is deemed

166. See, e.g., Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need).
167. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding heroin addiction and withdrawal constituted a serious medical need such that deliberate
indifference toward them constituted cruel and unusual punishment), with Bruederle, 687
F.3d at 777 (finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical
need).
168. See Shaver v. Brimfield Township, No. 5:11 CV 154, 2014 WL 7506908, at
*10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2014).
169. See Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 773.
170. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999). Such a ruling would
instead compel jails to adopt detoxification facilities and procedures, and would not mandate
hospital visits. See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (granting injunctive relief compelling the county jail to provide for detoxification
procedures and staff).
171. Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695–96. Officers detained the decedent after observing
erratic and drug-influenced behavior and finding evidence he had ingested PCP. Id.
at 694. After forcing the decedent to withdraw cold turkey, he resisted relocation from his
cell and died after wrestling with officers. Id. at 694–95.
172. See Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Constitution
does not require an arresting police officer or jail official to seek medical attention for
every arrestee or inmate who appears to be affected by drugs or alcohol.”).
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Constitutionally deficient under the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard, but
that day—should it arise—clearly lies in the future.”173
2. Over-leniency and Judicially Mandated Comfort
Strict adherence to evolving standards also risks judicially mandating
“comfortable prisons.”174 Several cases demonstrate how adherence to
the majority risks an overly lenient Eighth Amendment interpretation that
transforms the federal courts into a prison regulatory regime.175 Growing
public sympathy for particular groups or concern for particular conditions
could compel a federal court to enact publicly desired policy reforms, as
demonstrated in Helling v. McKinney.176 Here, the Supreme Court held
exposure to tobacco smoke constituted a serious medical need.177 Long term
detrimental effects of exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke, combined with
growing public concern around tobacco, indicated the Eighth Amendment
should protect inmates from secondhand smoke.178 The analysis ignored
the likelihood of suffering and death, or how long this process would take,
or the various issues with expanding Eighth Amendment protection to
include all medically detrimental conditions.179 A wide variety of conditions
could plausibly lead to negative health defects, without causing any pain,
suffering, or death in the short term.180 This vision of the Eighth Amendment
as a functional health code differs significantly from one restricted to
more imminent, dangerous, and severe inflictions and deprivations.181
173. Estate of Hellmann v. Kenton Cty. Jailer, No. 05–31–JGW, 2007 WL 1100730,
at *9 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 12, 2007). The evolving standards rule functions as it did in Graham,
allowing the court to ignore actual constitutional analysis and substitute its own policy
preferences. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–70 (2010).
174. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
175. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91.
176. See 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 36–37.
179. Id. at 35–36.
180. For example, conditions exposing detainees to asbestos fibers on a regular basis
could eventually cause various forms of cancer. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk,
N AT ’L CANCER I NST . (June 7, 2017), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causesprevention/risk/substances/asbestos/asbestos-fact-sheet#what-are-the-health-hazards-ofexposure-to-asbestos [https://perma.cc/54YF-U65W] (“[T]hose who develop asbestos-related
diseases show no signs of illness for a long time after exposure. It can take from 10 to 40
years or more for symptoms of an asbestos-related condition to appear.” (citing AGENCY
FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 49, 103 (2001), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tox
profiles/tp61.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2KT-BPEH].).
181. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
the Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation”);
see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (“[T[he Constitution does not
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In the Ninth Circuit case Colwell v. Bannister, a detainee developed
cataracts in both eyes during his sentence, and the prison only had one of
the cataracts removed.182 The remaining cataract did not cause pain, require
urgent medical attention, or pose a risk of permanent vision loss.183 The
untreated cataract represented a serious medical need because (1) it affected
the inmate’s daily activities and (2) a reasonable doctor would deem the
injury “worthy of comment or treatment.”184 This rule casts a massive net
to include any condition that could plausibly hinder a detainee, or earn a
doctor’s “comment.”185 The Ninth Circuit’s rule completely circumvents
the wanton infliction of pain requirement.186 Society might prefer prisons
repair inmates’ cataracts, but providing Eighth Amendment protection in
this case opened the door to almost any medical condition.
Decisions like Helling and Colwell, while perhaps reflective of societal
standards, dilute the Eighth Amendment’s meaning. What began as a baseline
prohibition on the wanton infliction of pain now risks transforming into a
powerful, court-driven regulatory tool to determine the finer points of
health policy in prisons.187
Hypothetically, the reasoning from Helling and Colwell could extend
Eighth Amendment protection to inmates with long-term mental or
emotional conditions. Long periods of detainment can cause detrimental
mental health conditions like anxiety and depression.188 Prison subjects
detainees to constant feelings of entrapment, detachment from family
and friends, memories of their own acts, and fear of harm.189 A highly
enclosed prison design could, perhaps, exacerbate these feelings. Therefore,

mandate comfortable prisons.”). A more restricted Eighth Amendment analysis would set
a clear minimum baseline for treatment and leave the finer points of prison regulation to
state legislatures. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 78.
182. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2014).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1066–67 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.
1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc)). The condition affected the inmate’s daily activities because it caused
him to run into objects. Id.
185. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91. Many conditions worthy of a medical professional’s
comment lack any pain or immediate negative health effects.
186. Id.
187. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See Liji Thomas, Prisoner Depression and Low Mood, NEWS MED. (Aug. 23,
2018), https://www.news-medical.net/health/Prisoner-Depression-and-Low-Mood.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KLS2-C7PL].
189. Id.
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depression represents a condition worthy of a doctor’s comment, and a
court in the Ninth Circuit could invoke the Eighth Amendment to protect this
condition and compel a prison redesign.190
A district court in the Ninth Circuit has already granted relief for an
inmate with a mental condition under a similar theory. The medical
community identifies gender dysphoria, which involves a person expressing
a different gender than their biological sex, as a medical condition.191 This
condition often involves anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts.192
Some argue gender reassignment surgery represents a necessary medical
remedy for this condition, in certain situations.193 It follows that the Ninth
Circuit’s test would identify the condition as a serious medical need, and
a prison’s refusal to provide the surgery would constitute deliberate
indifference, i.e., cruel and unusual punishment. Faced with an inmate
suffering from gender dysphoria, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted an injunction in Norsworthy v. Beard,
compelling a prison to provide the surgery.194 The Ninth Circuit did
not review this decision because California released the plaintiff before the
hearing, although some suggest it would have upheld the injunction.195
McGuckin v. Smith enshrines this all-inclusive approach to determining
serious medical needs and creates several problems in the process. The
Ninth Circuit in McGuckin established a formal test for evaluating serious
medical needs, to provide for more consistency and less room for courts
to substitute their own policy preferences.196 Under this test, a finding of
a serious medical need requires “[t]he existence of an injury that a
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment
190. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a
serious medical condition is one worthy of a reasonable doctor’s comment), overruled on
other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
191. See Victor J. Genchi, Comment, Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of
Care, 22 BARRY L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2016).
192. Id. at 94.
193. Id. (explaining how treatments for less severe forms of dysphoria include
psychotherapy and hormone therapy, while gender reassignment surgery addresses more
severe forms). Gender reassignment surgery involves surgically reshaping genitalia to
resemble those of the desired sex. See Ross Toro, How Gender Reassignment Surgery Works
(Inforgraphic), LIVE SCI. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www.livescience.com/39170-how-genderreassignment-surgery-works-infographic.html [https://perma.cc/G9HV-J55G]. Female-tomale reassignment costs over $50,000, while male-to-female reassignment costs between
$7,000 and $24,000. Id.
194. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187, 1190, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(granting injunctive relief under an Eighth Amendment theory).
195. See Genchi, supra note 191, at 95, 106.
196. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in
part on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
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or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial
pain.”197 Several federal appeals courts adopted the McGuckin test or a
similar version of it.198 These tests strike a balance between restricting
policy-based judicial intervention, and recognizing a constitutional duty
to provide medical care for prisoners. Only conditions acknowledged as
serious in the medical community have Eighth Amendment implications,
theoretically replacing the court’s potential policy preferences with objective
medical expertise.199
In some cases, the McGuckin test succeeded in striking this balance
between restricting policy input and requiring care for inmates with severe
needs. A Seventh Circuit decision categorized drug addiction as a serious
medical need under its formulation of the McGuckin test.200 The Eighth
Circuit came to the same conclusion with regard to a plaintiff’s inguinal
hernia.201 Meanwhile, under the McGuckin test, the Fifth Circuit declined
to categorize swollen wrists as a serious medical need,202 and the Eleventh
Circuit similarly declined with regard to a shaving-induced sensitive skin
condition.203

197. Id.
198. See Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a
serious medical need was “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention” (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890,
897 (6th Cir. 2004))); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] class
of cases in which the medical condition involved, while far from life-threatening, is
nevertheless sufficiently serious that the deliberately indifferent denial of medical care for
such a condition . . . [is] fully capable of supporting an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Mata
v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the prisoner “produce objective
evidence that the deprivation at issue was in fact ‘sufficiently serious’” as well as
“evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of mind” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994))); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2003)
(defining a serious medical need as “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40
F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994))).
199. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91.
200. See Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005).
201. See Johnson v. Lockhart, 941 F.2d 705, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff’s
inguinal hernia constituted a serious medical need).
202. See Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1990).
203. See Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986).
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However, the McGuckin test presents several problems. After adopting
versions of this test, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits declined to categorize
addiction as a serious medical need.204 The Sixth Circuit declined to analyze
the pain and risk associated with drug addiction, and instead focused on
policy, i.e., the potential burden on jail staff if the court designated drug
addiction as a serious medical need.205 The Eleventh Circuit similarly
based its decision on the implications of requiring jail officials and police
officers to seek medical attention for all drug-affected arrestees.206 Meanwhile,
federal courts used the McGuckin test to grant Eighth Amendment protection
for cases involving an infected toenail, a painful nasal condition, infected
teeth, a broken hand, tobacco smoke exposure, and cataracts.207 None
of these conditions poses a substantial risk of death or suffering, and some
completely lack pain as a symptom. Because the McGuckin test provides
Eighth Amendment protection for any condition a doctor could identify
as requiring treatment, courts can wield the constitution as a general health
code for nearly every condition.208
The evolving standards rule and its arbitrary application reveal an
inconsistent, unconstitutional, and unworkable method for evaluating
cruel and unusual practices.209 Generally, domestic majority opinion
determines the evolving standards of decency,210 except when the Court relies

204. See Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 773, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding opioid withdrawal did not automatically constitute a serious medical need because
prison staff cannot predict withdrawal intensity); see also Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d
1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Constitution does not require an arresting police officer or
jail official to seek medical attention for every arrestee or inmate who appears to be affected by
drugs or alcohol.”).
205. See Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777.
206. See Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1333.
207. See Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (8th Cir. 1991) (infected
toenail); Dace v. Solem, 858 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1988) (painful nasal condition); Fields
v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1984) (infected teeth); Bunton v. Englemyre, 557
F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (broken hand); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)
(tobacco smoke exposure); Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063–65 (9th Cir. 2014)
(cataracts).
208. See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1072 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“But McGuckin cannot
be a correct reading of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases, and unless we overturn it en
banc, we will make ourselves the authors of a ‘National Code of Prison Regulation . . . .’”
(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting))).
209. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.
210. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (declining to abolish the death
penalty because of domestic majority approval manifested in public opinion polling and
recent legislation).
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on minority public opinion,211 its own independent judgment,212 or
international norms.213 The Supreme Court would struggle to reconcile
these different methods to a complex issue like detainee addiction, where
gauges of public opinion, such as polls,214 jury verdicts,215 international
norms,216 and legislative enactments,217 prove inconclusive or difficult to
apply. Accordingly, lower federal courts struggle to categorize detainee
addiction and withdrawals, with regard to the Eighth Amendment.218
211. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (finding the evolving standards
of decency required treatment for an inmate’s injury despite only twenty-two states providing
for standards of care in prisons).
212. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (deriving the evolving standards
of decency from the Court’s “independent judgement”).
213. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (assessing international citizenship
practices to determine the evolving standard of decency).
214. See Illegal Drugs, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1657/illegal-drugs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/93H6-YRQC]. When asked how much they blamed different causes for
the opioid problem, respondents primarily blamed the pharmaceutical industry, doctors
overprescribing pain medication, lack of public knowledge, and patients demanding
painkillers, with 47% of respondents blaming patients “a lot.” Id.
215. See Table D-4, supra note 162. In federal courts, guilty jury verdicts for drug
offenders decreased incrementally from 932 in 2008, to 426 in 2018. See Table D-4 U.S.
District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major
Offense (Excluding Transfers), During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2008,
U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D04Dec08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PGG-2X2V]; Table D-4, supra note 162.
216. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME & WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
TREATMENT AND CARE FOR PEOPLE WITH DRUG USE DISORDERS IN CONTACT WITH THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41 (2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/UNODC_
WHO_Alternatives_to_Conviction_or_Punishment_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPW3-YWD8].
The UN provides an aspirational timetable for immediately evaluating and treating drug
offenders after first contact. Id. Seven countries have implemented some form of
medication-assisted treatment for opioid addicts. See BEAU KILMER ET AL., CONSIDERING
HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND SUPERVISED DRUG CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED
STATES 14 (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2693.html [https://perma.cc/
88X7-SCFZ].
217. See ROBERT CHILDS, N.C. HARM REDUCTION COALITION, LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND NALOXONE UTILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11, https://www.fda.gov/media/93172/
download [https://perma.cc/HVH7-94BT]. Out of around 18,000 police departments in
the United States, 577 carry naloxone, an emergency opioid overdose inhibiting drug. Id.;
DUREN BANKS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., NATIONAL SOURCES
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J74M-YW9D]. Only Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Vermont enacted
medication-assisted treatment programs for opioid-addicted detainees. See Linden et al.,
supra note 2, at 253.
218. See Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
opioid addiction constituted a serious medical need). But see Bruederle v. Louisville Metro
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C. Wanton and Unnecessary as a Constitutional and
Practical Rule
The problems with tethering Eighth Amendment understanding to
society’s evolving standards of decency necessitate a new approach to
evaluating claims of cruel and unusual punishment. This approach should
avoid trimming around the edges of Gamble and the factors for evaluating
serious medical needs, and instead focus on the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain.
“Wanton” commonly means “unreasonably or maliciously risking harm
while being utterly indifferent to the consequences.”219 Including wanton
as a modifier for infliction of pain captures the originally broad spirit behind
the Eighth Amendment, in which the Founders had in mind affirmative
tortures like hanging, drawing, and quartering, in addition to more passive
tortures, like conditions on prison ships.220 Conditions on British prison
ships subjected detainees to constant agony and death, and the consistent
British policy of ignoring these conditions would render them just as
liable under the Eighth Amendment as a prison utilizing the rack.221
Requiring the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or death
brings together passive and active forms of torture under the Eighth
Amendment.222 Justice Burger’s dissent in Furman argued that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments similar to torture in their extreme
cruelty.223 This rule appropriately encompasses the range of punishments
the Founders considered when writing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, without providing a blank check to courts seeking to categorize
any deprivation of comfort as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the evolving standards
rule, some courts still focus on the wanton and unnecessary infliction
of pain, exemplifying a more constitutional and practical approach.224
Meanwhile, retroactively applying this focus to past decisions further
illustrates the rule’s benefits.225

Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding opioid withdrawal did not automatically
constitute a serious medical need because prison staff cannot predict withdrawal intensity).
219. Wanton, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
220. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 232; Compeau, supra note 24.
221. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (recognizing that wanton and
unnecessary conduct includes deprivations); see also The HMS Jersey, supra note 23 (describing
prison ship conditions).
222. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
223. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
224. See discussion infra Section IV.C.1–2 (discussing Jones and Villarreal).
225. See discussion infra Section IV.C.3–4 (discussing Gamble and Colwell).

484

58-2_POST_WHITE_PAGES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 453, 2021]

5/27/2021 2:55 PM

Pain Speaks for Itself
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

1. Jones: Enforcing the Limits of the Eighth Amendment
The Florida Supreme Court followed this spirit in Jones v. Florida,
providing a template of a modern Eighth Amendment analysis focused purely
on wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.226 The Florida Supreme
Court invoked its “all writs” jurisdiction to hear the case, in which Leo Jones
sought to preclude his electric chair execution under the Eighth Amendment.227
The court found that the electric chair, when appropriately tested, did not
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.228 The Florida Supreme
Court ignored the question of whether societal standards condoned the electric
chair, and instead evaluated the necessity and degree of the pain involved
in the practice.229 Like any method of punishment, the electric chair
involves pain.230 However, the Constitution does not protect convicted
persons from “necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.”231 Here, the electric chair execution occurred
as part of a carefully regulated process in which Florida tested its equipment
and closely supervised the execution.232 This evidence did not indicate a
wanton and unnecessary practice because Florida carefully regulated electric
chair executions and they involved minimal, necessary pain.233 Despite
the Florida Supreme Court’s complete divergence from modern Eighth
Amendment interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition
for certiorari.234 While denial of certiorari does not automatically mean
226. See Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79–80 (Fla. 1997).
227. Id. at 76.
228. See id. at 79–80. The petitioner in Jones relied on a contemporary electric chair
execution that involved flame and smoke emanating from the apparatus. Id. at 79.
229. Id. at 79 (finding the national trend away from the electric chair should not influence
its decision about the practice’s constitutionality). The Florida Supreme Court sometimes
focuses purely on the prisoner’s pain, suffering, and torture-like experience, without
considering society’s preferences. See Erin Schatz, Comment, Deliberate Indifference: Is
There More to Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 171, 172 (1999).
230. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79–80.
231. Id. at 79 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464
(1947)). In Louisiana v. Resweber, the U.S. Supreme Court determined Louisiana could
attempt a second execution after the first execution in the electric chair had failed. See
329 U.S. 459, 465–66 (1947).
232. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79–80.
233. Id. at 79 (“[T]h[e] record [was] entirely devoid of evidence suggesting deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s well-being on the part of state officials.”).
234. See Timothy S. Kearns, Note, The Chair, the Needle, and the Damage Done:
What the Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-Execution Challenge Could
Mean for the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197, 212
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the Supreme Court agreed with the ruling, it does mean at least six justices
determined the Jones ruling did not warrant a review.235
2. Villarreal: A Renewed Focus on Pain
In Villarreal v. County of Monterey, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California arrived at its conclusion fully relying on a
wanton infliction of pain analysis, without mention of evolving standards
or Trop.236 Here, law enforcement arrested the decedent, Lara Gillis, and
quickly discerned that she suffered from drug addiction and mental illness
and had preexisting injuries.237 As her condition deteriorated over the next
twenty-eight hours, she begged for help and exhibited outward signs of
intense withdrawals.238 Despite officers noticing her condition during her
arrest and medical staff routinely observing her in the padded cell, Gillis
received no medical care during her detainment and died at a hospital two
weeks later.239 The jail subjected Gillis to immense suffering. She exhibited
outward signs of suffering with her cries and moans, and medical analysis
of her symptoms–drug withdrawal, organ failure, sepsis, low blood oxygen,
and low blood sugar–indicates these conditions involve severe pain.240
The Villarreal court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s division of
deliberate indifference into subjective and objective components,241
but ignored the broader McGuckin test. The district court instead worked
from the premise that serious medical conditions are those involving serious
pain and risk of death.242 McGuckin divided deliberate indifference analysis
(2005) (arguing that in Jones, the Florida Supreme Court “openly neglected” the evolving
standards rule set out in Trop (first citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and then
citing Jones, 701 So. 2d at 77–78)); see also Jones v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998) (denying
certiorari).
235. See Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 611,
612 (1984).
236. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
237. Id. at 1174.
238. Id. at 1174–75.
239. Id.
240. Id. Low blood oxygen and blood sugar can cause shaking, chills, dizziness,
migraines, seizures, difficulty breathing, and chest pain. See Joana Cavaco Silva, Low and
Normal Blood Oxygen Levels: What to Know, MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan. 28, 2020), https://
www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321044.php [https://perma.cc/6YP9-3RJQ]; Hypoglycemia
(Low Blood Sugar), AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/medicationmanagement/blood-glucose-testing-and-control/hypoglycemia [https://perma.cc/6FQF43S3]. Abuse and withdrawal from stimulants like cocaine can cause cardiac arrhythmias,
cardiac arrest, strokes, and death. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
DRUGS OF ABUSE 51–52 (2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/drug_of_abuse.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q52L-DLEE].
241. See Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1181.
242. Id.
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into two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the
nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”243 McGuckin noted, “[a]
serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’”244 For the first element, the Villarreal court cited the
characteristics of withdrawal as manifested in the present case, then for
the second element, it cited the jail staff’s behavior.245 The district court
also acknowledged the “seizures, hallucinations, agitation, and increased
blood pressure” associated with drug withdrawal.246 Finally, the district
court concluded, “[d]rug withdrawal constitutes a serious medical need
requiring appropriate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.”247
The Villarreal court analyzed the Monterey County Jail’s routine practice
and the extent to which it wantonly inflicted pain and suffering on addicted
detainees, and concluded the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment prohibited the practice.248 This analysis ignored the
historical considerations behind the Eighth Amendment, but the Founders
familiar with the routine pain, suffering, and death involved in the mistreatment
of detainees aboard British prison ships would agree the Amendment
exists to prevent situations like that in Villarreal.249
3. Gamble Revisited: Same Outcome, Better Rule
When a court focuses its analysis on the context and level or risk of
suffering placed on a detainee, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
still protects them in a wide variety of instances, suggesting courts need
not rely on the “evolving standards of decency” rule.250 In Gamble, the
plaintiff sustained an injury from a falling bale of cotton.251 He experienced

243. Id.
244. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
245. Villareal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1184–85.
246. Id. at 1184 (quoting Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929,
948 (N.D. Cal. 2015)).
247. Id. (citing Pajas v. County of Monterey, No. 16-CV-00945-LHK, 2016 WL
3648686, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016)).
248. Id. at 1184–87.
249. See Compeau, supra note 24.
250. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
251. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976).
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“intense” pain, and a doctor diagnosed his injury as a lower back strain.252
The doctor provided pain medication and eventually cleared the plaintiff,
despite the continued intense back and chest pain, high blood pressure,
and migraines.253 The plaintiff’s supervisors ordered him to return to work,
and when he refused, they placed him in solitary confinement.254 With
full knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition, prison staff forced him to endure
worsening pain for almost two months and threatened further punishment
to coerce him to work.255 The prison intentionally initiated this punishment
outside the bounds of his actual sentence, and inflicted severe and enduring
pain.256 Retroactively applying the Jones approach to Gamble still finds
the prison liable for cruel and unusual punishment because the pain was
not minimal, and it was not a necessary part of his scheduled punishment.257
Such behavior fell within the range of the original concerns behind the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and within the meaning of the
wanton and unnecessary rule.258
If only three states provided for prison standards of medical care in 1976,
instead of the actual number of twenty-two, strict adherence to the evolving
standards rule may have sanctioned the prison’s conduct in Gamble.
Despite the fact that a prison forced a detainee to perform manual labor
with a severely painful back condition, the requisite societal standards
would not have sufficiently evolved.259 The Supreme Court followed this
strict adherence in Gregg, upholding the death penalty because of its wide
legislative approval.260 Meanwhile, ignoring the evolving standards rule
and using “independent judgment” to make the same ruling invokes
constitutional issues involving the separation of powers.261 The forced
prison labor represented cruel and unusual punishment because the prison
consciously disregarded the risk of exacerbating the plaintiff’s severe back
condition, and consciously ignored his repeated requests for help or
252. Id. at 99. Lower back strains involve radiating pain, stiffness that restricts range
of motion and posture, muscle spasms, and persistent pain. See Low Back Strain and
Sprain, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, https://www.aans.org/Patients/NeurosurgicalConditions-and-Treatments/Low-Back-Strain-and-Sprain [https://perma.cc/6JM9-D3BU].
Doctors recommend avoiding strenuous activity, which will exacerbate the injury and
cause more severe pain. See Kojo Hamilton, Pulled Back Muscle and Lower Back Strain,
SPINE-HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/lower-back-pain/
pulled-back-muscle-and-lower-back-strain [https://perma.cc/D6HN-9FY2].
253. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 99–101.
254. Id. at 100.
255. Id. at 100–01.
256. Id.
257. See Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997).
258. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–37 (1879).
259. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
260. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–82 (1976).
261. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.
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reassignment.262 The objectively severe pain involved in the prison’s choice,
and the prison’s culpable mental state, could have appropriately guided
the Court’s analysis.
4. Colwell: Avoiding Judicially Mandated Comfort
This focus on wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain would preclude
certain conditions from Eighth Amendment protection.263 Retroactively
applying the Jones approach to Colwell, the prison satisfies the subjective
mental state requirement of wantonness, because the inmate repeatedly
requested care for his other eye and the prison consciously denied these
requests.264 While the case would still hinge on whether this deprivation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the absence of any severe pain
or life-threatening danger indicates the prison’s conduct conformed to
Eighth Amendment standards. When the prison denied the inmate’s requests
for a second surgery, the inmate continued his incarceration without pain,
the risk of pain, or even the possibility of permanent vision damage.265
Walking about a prison without full use of an eye differs significantly
from forced manual labor with a painful back condition, as described in
Gamble.266 The Ninth Circuit could reasonably conclude the prison’s
neglect of this plaintiff’s particular condition did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
V. SOLUTION
This Comment proposes a solution to reconcile the applicability and
constitutionality of Wilkerson with the concerns of Trop. The proposal
returns the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to the original dichotomy
described in Wilkerson, but with the understanding that any active or passive
practice can resemble torture in its wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain or exposure to a substantial risk of death. The Supreme Court would
have the opportunity to enact this solution after granting certiorari to a
lower court decision on cruel and unusual punishment.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 100–01.
See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 1063, 1071.
See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 99–101.
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A. Proposed Analytical Framework
This Comment’s solution would conduct cruel and unusual analysis in
the following manner: A particular practice constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment if it involves the wanton infliction of severe pain or death.267
Arbitrary, unregulated, drawn out, and inconsistent processes wantonly
inflict pain.268 Any pain resembling torture in its severity represents
unnecessary pain.269 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the active, affirmative
infliction of severe pain,270 and passive infliction of severe pain through
deprivation.271 Depriving a detainee of medical care for a serious medical
need only constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when doing so results
in the wanton infliction of severe pain.272 Wanton, reckless, or deliberately
indifferent conduct satisfies the subjective mental state requirement for
cruel and unusual punishment cases.273
B. Overruling the Evolving Standards Rule
Cruel and unusual analysis relying solely on the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain overrules Trop in eliminating the evolving standards
rule.274 The Supreme Court adheres to its own precedent under the doctrine
of stare decisis, but recognizes that this doctrine does not represent an
“inexorable command.”275 The Court has identified several factors when

267. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“First, the punishment must
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))).
268. See id. at 188, 206–07 (finding Georgia’s sentencing scheme sufficiently reduced
the possibility of arbitrary and capricious punishments to pass constitutional muster).
269. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
270. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding unnecessary prison
beatings constituted cruel and unusual punishment even when they did not result in serious
injury).
271. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (recognizing that wanton and
unnecessary conduct includes deprivations); see also Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 (finding
that deliberately depriving detainees of medical care for serious medical needs constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment).
272. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992).
273. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–38 (recognizing that the definition of “deliberate
indifference” is consistent with the definition of recklessness or wanton under the criminal
law, which holds a person accountable when he “disregards a risk of harm of which he is
aware”).
274. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“[T]he [Eighth] Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”).
275. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
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considering whether to overrule its own precedent.276 These factors include:
“the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other
related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and
reliance on the decision.”277
The problems facing the evolving standards rule from the Trop decision
fall into each of these categories. The decision contained flawed reasoning,
namely that societal standards evolve in a continuously lenient or progressive
direction, and that courts can consistently deduce these standards through
objective indicators like public opinion polling.278 The evolving standards
rule from the Trop decision proved unworkable as the Court struggled to
apply it consistently and sometimes ignored it outright.279 The decision
contradicts precedents like Wilkerson and the constitutional separation of
powers.280 Since the Trop decision, societal standards evolved away from
leniency for drug users, demonstrating societal standards do not reliably
evolve toward leniency for all classes of detainees.281 Trop did not create
“a clear or easily applicable standard,” indicating “arguments for reliance
based on its clarity are misplaced.”282 The evolving standards rule from
the Trop decision may provide cover for jails and prisons that force addicted
detainees to withdraw cold turkey, indicating some level of reliance, but
these public institutions can readily reverse these policies with appropriate
changes in procedure.283 These arguments provide the necessary legal
basis for overruling Trop.

276. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–
79 (2018).
277. Id.
278. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
279. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
280. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1.
281. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
282. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct.
2080, 2098 (2018)) (acknowledging a rule’s clarity could strengthen the reliance argument
in favor of the rule’s preservation); see also discussion supra Part IV (arguing courts
inconsistently apply the evolving standards rule, relying on different factors and using the
rule’s ambiguity to decide cases based on their policy preferences).
283. See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959–60 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (outlining procedural changes to adequately treat detoxifying detainees); see also
Trickey, supra note 4 (finding Rhode Island’s successful medication-assisted treatment
program in its prison system costs the state $2 million annually).
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C. Addressing Potential Challenges
This solution would expand the umbrella of cruel and unusual punishment
to cover any practices that deliberately ignore objectively high levels of
pain or life-threatening conditions. It would also retract the umbrella of
cruel and unusual punishment from practices lacking any severe pain or
life-threatening conditions.284 One criticism of the new formulation would
point out that the new umbrella provides substantial latitude for courts to
place a bevy of new conditions under Eighth Amendment protection.285
It would seem the new formulation simply replaces one mechanism for
inserting policy preferences—the evolving standards rule—for another.
This line of criticism ignores the constraints that the proposed solution
places on courts, compared to the present approach. First, a court could
not pick and choose favorable societal indicators to arrive at a desired outcome,
because the solution scraps the evolving standards rule.286 Eliminating
the evolving standards rule and providing a specific legal analysis would
also prevent a court from inserting its independent judgement when
societal indicators point toward an undesirable outcome.287 Second, the
proposed solution excludes deliberate indifference to conditions causing
less than severe pain or a substantial risk of death. Under this solution,
a court would be hard pressed to extend Eighth Amendment protection in
cases that fail to clear the threshold of severe pain or risk of death, such
as those featuring mere discomfort, aches, deficient sanitation, nuisances,
inconveniences, and elective procedures.288 Courts could not wield the
McGuckin test, where any condition “that a reasonable doctor or patient

284. See discussion supra Section IV.C.2.
285. A different proposed solution argues that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause originally meant “contrary to long usage,” and only a return to this original meaning
will sufficiently constrain judicial policymaking and insulate the Eighth Amendment from
public opinion. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 89–90. This formulation would compel
courts to enforce longstanding practice, without making value or policy-based assessments
of a punishment’s seriousness. Id. The Eighth Amendment would prohibit life sentences
without parole for juveniles simply because those sentences became common during the
1990s and contradicted longstanding practice. Id. at 90. Courts favored this approach in
the years following the American founding. See Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (upholding a state statute depriving convicted duelers of their right
to vote because it conformed to longstanding practice), aff’d, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 1824);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (1 Call) 555 (Va. 1799) (striking down a joint fine imposed
on four defendants convicted of assaulting a magistrate because joint fines violated the
longstanding ban on punishing one for the wrongdoing of another).
286. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20, 520 n.16 (1968) (citing a
favorable death penalty poll while ignoring contemporary reputable polls showing much
higher support).
287. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
288. See discussion supra Section IV.C.2.
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would find important and worthy of comment or treatment” or any “condition
that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities” would receive
Eighth Amendment protection.289 Third, this solution maintains the mental
state requirement of recklessness, wantonness, and deliberate indifference.
Negligent or accidental failures to identify or address conditions would not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.290
Capital punishment would pose an immediate challenge to this new
cruel and unusual analysis. In previous Supreme Court cases, the evolving
standards rule protected capital punishment, because the American body
politic widely approved of the practice.291 This Comment’s formulation
eliminates this protection for capital punishment, but it does not eliminate
the rules for limiting capital punishment only when arbitrarily applied or
involving a lingering death. Furman temporarily struck down capital
punishment because of its widespread unregulated and arbitrary application.292
Scheduled capital punishment, when applied in a regulated regime without
risk of a lingering death, conforms to the original spirit behind the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, and this Comment’s solution.293 Death
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the context of unscheduled
capital punishment, resembling the death of Lara Gillis in Villarreal,294 or
in the context of arbitrarily applied capital punishment, resembling the
plaintiff’s treatment in Furman,295 or when it subjects one to a lingering

289. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992).
290. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–38 (1994).
291. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–83 (1976) (finding legislative activity,
jury verdicts, and public opinion indicated the standards of decency condoned the death
penalty).
292. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
293. Id. at 242–43 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is evidence that the provision
of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the language of the Eighth Amendment
was taken, was concerned primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh
penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe
nature . . . .” (citing Granucci, supra note 34, at 845–46)). Under one historical theory,
the replacement of Saxon with Norman law in eleventh century England brought an end
to the emphasis on consistency and proportionality between crime and punishment,
necessitating the return to this emphasis in the Magna Carta. See Granucci, supra note 34,
at 845–46.
294. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
295. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153–54 (“[W]here this court held to be violative of those
Amendments death sentences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled
discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty . . . .” (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40)).
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death, i.e., pain outside of the “necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.”296
D. Complying with the New Rule
Under the solution offered in this Comment, reckless, deliberately
indifferent, or wanton failures to treat detainee addiction and withdrawal
will often constitute cruel and unusual punishment. States can respond to
this change with legislation providing for adequate detoxification procedures,
facilities, and staff in state prisons and jails.297 Processing potential addicts
and ensuring their detainment does not subject them to suffering and risk of
death requires (1) timely, professional medical evaluation; (2) monitoring;
and (3) immediate and sustained pharmacological treatment.298 Different
types of addiction require different protocols for adequate assessment.299
Over 50% of inmates in prisons and jails depend on or abuse drugs in
some way.300 Opioid abuse accounts for an increasing share of addiction
in the United States, and an estimated 42,000 Americans died from opioid
abuse in 2016.301 Consequently, about 25% of the country’s inmates depend
on or abuse opioids.302 The literature suggests prisons adopt medicationassisted treatment (MAT) for opioid withdrawal,303 to avoid tragic cases
like Estate of Abdollahi v. City of Sacramento.304 MAT involves administering
“opioid agonists” like methadone and buprenorphine-naloxone.305 These
chemicals counteract the dangerous effects of withdrawal and suppress
powerful opioid cravings.306

296. Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
(finding punishments are cruel and unusual when they involve a “lingering death”).
297. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 261–62.
298. See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959–60 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (granting injunctive relief providing for adequate detoxification treatment for detainees).
299. Id. at 960.
300. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.
301. Id.
302. See Trickey, supra note 4.
303. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. Inmate deaths most often occur during
the days immediately following booking, with drugs and alcohol playing a significant
role. See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra note 6, at 2–3.
304. See Estate of Abdollahi v. County of Sacramento, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200
(E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding the decedent suffered from opioid withdrawal and committed
suicide in his cell after a lapse in observation).
305. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.
306. Id. Inmate deaths due to overdoses and withdrawal from drugs and alcohol are
preventable when prisons adopt reforms like providing MAT. See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS.,
supra note 6, at 2–3.
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Experimental statewide MAT programs have not proven overly burdensome
or difficult to implement. In 2016, Rhode Island enacted a program that
provided MAT and drug abuse counseling throughout its prison system.307
This program costs Rhode Island $2 million annually and successfully
reduced the number of overdose deaths in the state’s prison population.308
Enacting this program helped the state prison system comply with Eighth
Amendment standards, at a relatively low cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
C.S. Lewis described pain as a “megaphone to rouse a deaf world” that
“shatters the illusion that all is well.”309 The human body’s rejection of pain
represents a timeless measuring tool for cruelty because it speaks, and
often shouts, for itself. Certain practices, from beatings, to forced labor
with a back injury, to drug withdrawal, will always create objectively high
levels of suffering, regardless of society’s contemporary standards. Society’s
feelings about these high levels of pain may change, condoning it for some
groups and rejecting it for others, but pain still speaks for itself, vocally
demanding redress like the decedent’s cries for help in Villarreal.310 The
constitutional implications of this pain should turn on its severity, without
the secondary question of whether society condones this severity. The
proposed solution eliminates the evolving standards rule and restricts cruel
and unusual punishment to practices causing severe pain or the substantial
risk of death. The Supreme Court should promptly correct its cruel and
unusual analysis and return to a practice consistent with the original spirit
behind the Eighth Amendment.

307. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 261–62. Rhode Island provides immediate
assistance to withdrawing detainees and long-term assistance to facilitate reintegration
with society. See Andrea Hsu & Ari Shapiro, Rhode Island Prisons Push to Get Inmates
the Best Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 19, 2018, 2:13 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/19/668340844/rhode-island-prisonspush-to-get-inmates-the-best-treatment-for-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/T3HG-MLPL].
308. See Trickey, supra note 4. After a spike in drug overdoses statewide, Rhode
Island’s legislature “easily” passed the bill instituting MAT in state prisons. See Linden
et al., supra note 2, at 261. In 2016, before instituting the reforms, twenty-six inmates died
from drug overdoses, while only nine died the following year. See Trickey, supra note 4.
309. C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 81, 83 (1944).
310. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
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